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INTRODUCTION

Ba bump. Ba bump. Tie game. John Jouer races down the court with
seconds left in the fourth quarter. He splits the trap, stops on a dime,
raises up, and swish. Jubilation rings throughout the home arena.
Thousands, if not millions, of fans cheer from the comfort of their homes
or at sports bars. Everyone was focused on the game, but not everyone
saw the game-the business of the NCAA. Everyone got paid. The
NCAA, schools, broadcasters, sideline reporters, coaches, concession
workers, and even the students who worked in the arena got paid. Hey,
what about the student-athletes who played the game? Alright, maybe not
everyone got paid.
On September 30, 2019, California Governor Gavin Newsom
approved Senate Bill No. 206, which allows student-athletes in
California's postsecondary educational institutions to profit from their
* A lot has changed since I wrote this Note (for example, I was a law student, now I am
an attorney), but one thing has remained the same: the joy I feel knowing that I have contributed
something to legal scholarship. I am eternally grateful to my family and friends for their support.
I am thankful for the editors at JLPP who worked meticulously to make this Note as great as
possible. To the reader, I hope you enjoy reading this Note and that it inspires you to influence

change.
1. In basketball, a trap is a defensive strategy used to force a turnover by surrounding the
ball-handler with two or more defensive players. Basketball trap, ROoKrE ROAD,
https://www.rookieroad.com/basketball/coaching/trap/
[https://perma.cc/LW33-6X47]
(last

visited Jan. 4, 2020).
109

110

UNIVERSITY OFFLORIDA JOURNAL OFLAW & PUBLIC POLICY

[Vol. 32

names, images, and likenesses without losing their scholarship
eligibility. 2 Although California's new law has garnered a lot of attention,
it is important to note that other states and even members of Congress
intend to introduce, or are in the process of introducing, similar
legislation to allow student-athletes to profit from their names, images,
and likenesses. 3 On HBO's The Shop, Governor Newsom stated that the
"[law] is going to change college sports for the better by having now the
interest finally of the athletes on par with the interests of the
institutions." 4 Unsurprisingly, the NCAA begs to differ.5 Before the bill
was signed into law, the NCAA issued a response describing how the bill
would negatively impact college athletics. 6 The NCAA indicated that
allowing student-athletes to profit from their names, images, and
likenesses would negatively impact the amateurism? component of
college sports and remove the element of fairness in recruitment of
college athletes. 8 On one hand, the NCAA warned that it would consider
responding to California's bill by barring California's student-athletes
from participating in NCAA competitions." On the other hand, the NCAA
indicated that it was already working on changing its likeness rule.10
On October 29, 2019, about a month after Governor Newsom signed
California's likeness bill into law, the NCAA announced that its Board
of Governors voted "unanimously to permit students participating in
athletics the opportunity to benefit from the use of their name, image, and
likeness in a manner consistent with the collegiate model." 11 Although
the announcement generated a lot of positive reactions, the details, or lack

2. CAL. EDUC. CODE

§ 67456 (West 2019).

3. Steve Berkowitz, College Sports: CaliforniaGovernor Signs Image andLikeness Bill,
USA TODAY (Sept. 30, 2019), https://www.usatoday.com/story/sports/college/2019/09/30/
42
2
college-sports-california-governor-signs-image-and-likeness-bill/ 367 6001/ [https://perma.cc/

L6ZG-PGUD].
4. UNINTERRUPTED, Gavin Newsom Signs California's 'FairPay to Play Act' with LeBron
James & Mav Carter, YOUTUBE (Sept. 30, 2019), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v
=7bfBgjxVgTw [https://perma.cc/8MVU-Y832].
5. NCAA Board of Governors, NCAA Responds to CaliforniaSenate Bill 206, NCAA
11, 2019), http://www.ncaa.org/about/resources/media-center/news/ncaa-responds(Sept.
california-senate-bill-206 [https://permacc/LZ62-PDNP]; see also Berkowitz, supra note 3.
6. NCAA Board of Governors, supra note 5.
7. Amateurism, NCAA, http://www.ncaa.org/student-athletes/future/amateurism [https://
perma.cc/JN4S-7LB8] (last visited Jan. 3, 2020) (listing actions that may impact amateur status
of student-athletes) [hereinafter Amateurism].
8. NCAA Board of Governors, supra note 5.

9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Steve Berkowitz & Dan Wolken, NCAA Board of Governors Opens Door to Athletes
Benefiting from Name, Image and Likeness, USA TODAY (Oct. 29, 2019, 9:26 PM),
2
https://www.usatoday.com/story/sports/college/ 019/10/29/ncaa-board-opens-door-athletes-use-

name-image-and-likeness/2492383001/ [https://permacc/SNW3-PMVW].
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thereof, accompanying the announcement should make one wary.1 The
NCAA Board of Governors outlined the various principles and guidelines
that they will use to change the NCAA's name, image and likeness rule.' 3
One of the guidelines states that the NCAA's new name, image and
likeness rule should "make clear the distinction between collegiate and
professional opportunities."' 4 This guideline is a cause for concern
because the NCAA may define the distinction between collegiate and
professional opportunities in a manner that prevents student-athletes from
having full control over how they profit off of their names, images, or
likenesses. Furthermore, the NCAA announced that its new rule would
reflect the NCAA's consistent belief that student-athletes are students,
not employees, of the universities they attend. '" Whether student-athletes
are employees is an interesting question,1 6 but its resolution is
unnecessary to resolving the issue at hand. Student-athletes must be
allowed to profit from their names, images, or likenesses (Identity) in a
country where they generate billions' 7 of dollars for the NCAA.
In their response to California's new law, the NCAA stated that
California's bill was unconstitutional.1 8 However, it is the NCAA's
actions that violate the Constitution. The purpose of this Note is to show
that the First Amendment should protect the ability of student-athletes to
profit from their Identities. Part I of this Note will evaluate how Identity
is traditionally protected under the right of publicity. 19 Part II will explain
the tension between the First Amendment and the right of publicity. 2 Part
III will discuss the various theories that guide First Amendment
protections and demonstrate how the self-fulfillment theory applies to
student-athletes. 2 1 Part IV will explain how the commercial speech
doctrine of the First Amendment can protect the ability of student-athletes
12. Sally Jenkins, Don't be Fooled by Empty Rhetoric: The NCAA Isn't Going to Change
Voluntarily, WASH. POST (Oct. 29, 2019, 6:59 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/sports/
colleges/dont-be-fooled-by-empty-rhetoric-the-ncaa-isnt-going-to-change-voluntarily/2019/10/

29/0988dfcc-fa9a-1I e9-8906-ab6b60de9124 story.html [https://perma.cc/L2SE-26YJ].
13. Stacey Osburn, Board of Governors Start Process to Enhance Name, Image and
Likeness Opportunities, NCAA (Oct. 29, 2019, 1:08 PM), http://www.ncaa.org/about/
resources/media-center/news/board-governors-starts-process-enhance-name-image-and-like

ness-opportunities [https://perma.cc/6Z89-SZ5P].
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. See Lori K. Mans & J. Evan Gibbs, Student Athletes As Employees?, FLA. B.J. 34, 36
(Apr. 2015) (discussing the trend in student-athletes seeking recognition as employees).

17. Darren Rovell, NCAA Tops $1 Billion in Revenue During 2016-17 School Year, ESPN
(Mar. 7, 2018), https://www.espn.com/college-sports/story/_/id/22678988/ncaa-tops-I-billionrevenue-first [https://perma cc/PZ8G-QFU8].
18. NCAA Board of Governors, supra note 5.
19. See infra Part I.

20. See infra Part II.
21. See infra Part Ill.
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to profit from their Identities. 2 2 Lastly, Part V of this Note will illustrate
how student-athletes can enforce their First Amendment commercial
23
speech rights against the NCAA even though it is a private actor.
I. THE RIGHT OF PUBLICITY
The right of publicity arose from the right of privacy, which was
articulated in the 1890 law review article written by Samuel D. Warren
and Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy.2 4 Warren and Brandeis
defined the right of privacy as a general right to be left alone, 2 5 and they
argued that the right of privacy protects the facts relating to one's private
life. 2 6 In 1953, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals became the first court
to recognize a right ofpublicity. 27 In HaelanLabs., Inc. v. Topps Chewing
Gum, Inc.,28 the court extracted the right of publicity from the right of
privacy and held that the right of publicity involved the exclusive right to
control who publishes or uses one's picture. 2 9 Even after the Haelan
court's recognition of the right of publicity, most courts were slow to
recognize and protect the right of publicity until after William Prosser's
influential 1960 law review article. 30 Prosser argued that the right of
privacy should be divided into four separate categories: (1) intrusion; (2)
disclosure; (3) false light; and (4) appropriation. 3 Prosser argued that the
Haelan decision best fit the fourth category because it was a case
involving "the exclusive use of the plaintiffs name and likeness as an
aspect of his identity." 32 Since the publication of Prosser's article, a
majority of states have recognized the right of publicity. 33 However,
34
Congress has failed to enact a federal right of publicity.
22. See infra Part IV.
23. See infra Part V.
24. Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right of Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193
(1890); see also William K. Ford & Raizel Liebler, Games Are Not Coffee Mugs: Games and the
Right of Publicity, 29 SANTA CLARA COMPUT. & HIGH TECH. L.J. 1, 6 (2013) ("The standard
account of the right of publicity begins with Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis' 1890
article ... 'The Right to Privacy.').
25. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 24, at 205.

26.
27.
(2017).
28.
29.
30.

Id.
Eric E. Johnson, Disentanglingthe Right of Publicity, 111 Nw. U. L. REV. 891, 896
202 F.2d 866 (2d Cir. 1953).
Id. at 868.
Michael Feinberg, A Collision Course Between the Right of Publicity and the First

Amendment: The Thirdand Ninth CircuitFindEA Sports'sNCAA FootballVideo Games Infringe
FormerStudent-Athletes Right of Publicity, 11 SETON HALL CIR. REV. 175, 183-85 (2014).

31. Id. at 183.
32. Id. at 183-84 (quoting Prosser, Privacy, 48 CALIF. L. REV. 383, 406 (1960)).
33. See id. at 184.
34. 1 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY & ROGER E. SCHECHTER, THE RIGHTS OF PUBLICITY
PRIVACY § 1:2 (2d ed. 2019).

AND
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The right of publicity is a state law right that essentially protects the
time, money, and energy one spends on creating value in one's Identity."
The majority view is that the right of publicity protects ordinary people
as well as celebrities. 36 This view leads to a simpler, and frankly better,
application of the right of publicity because a celebrity and a noncelebrity are both capable of suffering from commercial exploitation of
their Identities. 37 The right of publicity as it exists in the various states
can be defined as a person's right to control the commercial use of his or
her Identity. 38 In general, to recover under the right of publicity, a
plaintiff must prove the following: (1) plaintiff has a right to control the
commercial value of his or her Identity or another's Identity; (2)
defendant used the plaintiff s Identity without the plaintiff's permission;
and (3) defendant's use of plaintiffs Identity is likely to cause damage to
the commercial value of plaintiff's Identity. 39
The first element will likely seldom be at issue unless the relevant
state law refuses to recognize commercial rights in one's Identity. 4 0 In
regard to the second element, a key inquiry is whether the defendant's
use of plaintiff's Identity is identifiable. 4 1 Identifiability turns on whether
it is clear from a visual examination of a representative photo of plaintiff
and the accused image that the defendant is using plaintiffs Identity. 42
The amount of people who identify or would reasonably identify the
plaintiff from defendant's work is immaterial to deciding whether the
plaintiff's Identity is identifiable in defendant's work; the focus is mainly
whether the plaintiff's Identity was recognizable. 43

35. See Comedy III Prods., Inc. v. Gary Saderup, Inc., 21 P.3d 797, 804-05 (2001).
36. MCCARTHY & SCHECHTER, supra note 34, at § 4:2.
37. See Onassis v. Christian Dior-New York, Inc., 472 N.Y.S.2d 254, 260 (Sup. Ct. 1984),
affd, 488 N.Y.S.2d 943 (1985) ("The principle to be distilled from a study of the statute [which
prohibited the commercial use of a living person's name, portrait or picture without written
consent] and of the cases construing it is that all persons, of whatever station in life, from the
relatively unknown to the world famous, are to be secured against rapacious commercial
exploitation.").
38. MCCARTHY & SCHECHTER, supra note 34, § 1:3.

39. /d. § 3:2.
40. Id. § 3:3.
41. Id. § 3:10.
42. Id.
43. See Hirsch v. S.C. Johnson & Son, Inc., 280 N.W. 2d 129, 137 (1979) ("In the instant
case, it is not disputed at this juncture of the case that the nickname identified the plaintiff Hirsch.
It is argued that there were others who were known by the same name. This, however, does not

vitiate the existence of a cause of action."); Negri v. Schering Corp., 333 F. Supp. 101, 104
(S.D.N.Y. 1971) ("[T]he number of people who recognized the photograph in the advertisement
as Miss Negri, while it may be relevant on the question of damages, is not material on the issue
of liability. On that issue the question is whether the figure is recognizable, not the number of

people who recognized it.").
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In general, a student-athlete should be able to assert that they have a
right to control the commercial value of their Identities.4 It will likely be
easy for a student-athlete to establish that the defendant's use of their
Identities was recognizable. For instance, if a student-athlete's picture or
name was used to promote an athletic competition or event, then it would
be easy to establish that the defendant's use of plaintiff's Identity clearly
identified plaintiff. Nevertheless, the issue is that the student-athlete's
right to control the commercial value of their Identity would not be
guaranteed across the several states because there is not a federal right of
publicity establishing a baseline standard, and states differ in their
formulation of the right of publicity.4 5 The majority view is that intent to
identify or injure the plaintiff is unnecessary to establish a claim for
infringement of plaintiff s right of publicity. 4 6 For example, the Missouri
Supreme Court held that in a right of publicity suit, the plaintiff does not
need to prove that the defendant intended to injure plaintiff or succeeded
47
in obtaining a commercial advantage by using plaintiff's Identity.
Instead, the plaintiff only needs to prove that the defendant intended to
obtain a commercial advantage. 4 8
In contrast, the minority view is that the plaintiff must prove intent to
establish a claim for infringement of plaintiff's right of publicity. 49 For
example, in Oklahoma to establish the prima facia case for the statutory
right of publicity, the plaintiff must establish three elements: "(1)
defendants knowingly used [plaintiff's] name or likeness, (2) on
products, merchandise or goods, (3) without [plaintiff's] prior consent."5 0
The lack of a uniform right of publicity is particularly troubling in a time
where the world is more connected than ever before. Student-athletes
participate in competitions in neighboring states and across the country,
and their performances are televised and posted on a plethora of social
media platforms. Given the lack of a uniform right of publicity among
the states, a student-athlete may be vulnerable to exploitation in
Oklahoma, but not Missouri, and vice versa, depending on the situation.
Even in states that have relatively strong right of publicity laws, studentathletes will not be fully protected because, under certain circumstances,

44. MCCARTHY & SCHECHTER, supra note 34, § 3:3.
45. Kevin L. Vick & Jean-Paul Jassy, Why A Federal Right of Publicity Statute is
Necessary, COMMC'NS. LAw., Aug. 2011, at 14 (discussing how different states have widely

divergent right of publicity laws and why a federal right of publicity is necessary to bring
uniformity and predictability to right of publicity law).
46. MCCARTHY & SCHECHTER, supra note 34, § 3:14.
47. Doe v. TCI Cablevision, 110 S.W.3d 363, 370-71 (Mo. 2003).
48. Id. at 371.
49. MCCARTHY & SCHECHTER, supra note 34, § 3:14.
50. Bates v. Cast, 316 P.3d 246, 254 (Okla. Civ. App. 2013); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12,
§ 1449 (West 2019).

MONE.Y TA LKS

20211]

115

one's right of publicity may be overcome by another's First Amendment
rights.
II. RIGHT OF PUBLICITY VS. FIRST AMENDMENT

- In Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broad. Co.,51 the Supreme Court
evaluated, for the first time, the tension between the right of publicity and
the First Amendment.5 2 In Zacchini, a television broadcasting station,
without consent, videotaped and broadcasted an entertainer's entire act,
which consisted of being "shot from a cannon into a net some 200 feet
away." 5 3 The Court articulated that protecting the right of publicity is
important because it economically incentivizes individuals to produce
works of interest to the public. 54 The Court also recognized that the
broadcasting of entertainment is protected under the First Amendment. 5
However, upon balancing the interest underlying the entertainer's right
of publicity and the broadcast station's First Amendment rights, the Court
reasoned that the broadcast station's First Amendment rights would not
be infringed because the entertainer did not seek to stop the broadcast of
his performance; he simply wanted to be compensated for it. 56 In
summary, Zacchini stands for two propositions: (1) the state-law right of
publicity protects one's ability to commercially exploit his or her Identity;
and (2) the interest underlying the right of publicity is not automatically
outweighed by the interest underlying the First Amendment. 57
Although the Court in Zacchinibalanced the interest between the right
of publicity and the First Amendment, it did not articulate a uniform
balancing test. As a result, the lower courts have experimented with a
multitude of tests over the years.5 8 Aside from an ad-hoc balancing test,
the three balancing tests that lower courts have used to weigh the interest
protected by the right of publicity against the interest protected by the
First Amendment include: (1) the Predominant Use Test; (2) the Rogers
Test; and (3) the Transformative Use Test. 59 The Predominant Use Test
focuses on whether the main purpose of a product is to exploit the
commercial value of an individual's Identity or make an expressive
comment about said individual. 60 If the main or predominant purpose of
the product is to exploit the individual's Identity, then the product is not
51. 433 U.S. 562 (1977).
52. Feinberg, supra note 30, at 188.

53. Zacchini, 433 U.S. at 563.
54. Id. at 576.
55. Id. at 578.

56. Id.
57. Id. at 574-75; Feinberg, supranote 30, at 189.
58. Feinberg, supra note 30, at 190.

59. Id. at 193.
60. Mark S. Lee, Agents of Chaos: Judicial Confusion in Defining the Right of PublicityFree Speech Interface, 23 Loy. L.A. ENT. L. REv. 471, 500 (2003).
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protected by the First Amendment, and it violates the individual's right
of publicity.61 However, if the predominant purpose of the product is to
make an expressive comment about an individual, then it may be
protected under the First Amendment. 62
In Doe v. TCI Cablevision,63 Tony Twist, a professional hockey
player, sued McFarlane and various companies associated with a comic
book for using his name, without consent, for one of the villains in the
comic book.64 The Missouri Supreme Court employed the Predominant
Us6 Test and held that "the use and identity of Twist's name has become
predominantly a ploy to sell comic books and related products rather than
an artistic or literary expression, and under these circumstances, free
speech must give way to the right of publicity." 65 The Predominant Use
Test is interesting because it presents a balancing test that accurately
emphasizes the core issue underlying the tension between the right of
publicity and the First Amendment-exploitation. 66 When a celebrity
asserts the right of publicity, she is attempting to prevent others from
exploiting her Identity. Although the Predominant Use Test seems like it
would be a good test for balancing the right of publicity and the First
Amendment, only the Missouri Supreme Court has adopted it.67
The Rogers Test, unlike the Predominant Use Test, has been adopted
by a number of courts. The Rogers Test involves two factors: (1) whether
the use of the individual's name in the work was "wholly unrelated" to
the work, or (2) whether the use of the individual's name in the work was
"simply a disguised commercial advertisement for the sale of goods or
services." 68 In Rogers v. Grimaldi69 Academy Award winning
entertainer Ginger Rogers, sued the producers of a film for using her
name in the title of their movie. 70 The court held that Rogers did not have
a right of publicity claim because the title of the movie was related to the
content of the movie and was not simply a disguised commercial
advertisement for a product.7 1 Courts have applied the Rogers Test to
resolve tensions between trademarks and the First Amendment. 72

61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.

Id.
Id
110 S.W.3d 363 (Mo. 2003).
Id. at 367.
Id. at 374.
Lee, supra note 60, at 500.

67. Feinberg, supra note 30, at 195.

68. Rogers v. Grimaldi, 875 F.2d 994, 1004 (2d Cir. 1989).
69. Id at 994.
70. Id at 997.
71. Id at 1004-05.
72. See Mattel, Inc. v. MCA Records, Inc., 296 F.3d 894, 901 (9th Cir. 2002); Cliffs Notes,
Inc. v. Bantam Doubleday Dell Pub. Grp., Inc., 886 F.2d 490, 494 (2d Cir. 1989) (holding that
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In Mattel, Inc. v. MCA Records, Inc., 73 the makers of Barbie sued
music companies who produced, marketed, and sold a song titled "Barbie
Girl" for trademark infringement and dilution. 74 The court applied the
Rogers Test and held that MCA's use of Barbie did not infringe Mattel's
trademark because the use of Barbie in the song title was relevant to the
song itself, and the song title did not strongly suggest that the song was
produced by Mattel. 75 Although the Rogers Test was formulated in a case
involving the right of publicity, the test itself does not adequately resolve
the tensions underlying the right of publicity and the First Amendment
when trademarks are not involved. 76 The Rogers Test fails to adequately
balance the interest of celebrities in their Identities because it focuses on
whether an artistic or literary work misleads consumers and the test fails
to appreciate the fact that the right of publicity protects the interest of the
celebrity, not the consumer. 77
Unlike the Predominant Use Test and the Rogers Test, the
Transformative Use Test has been widely embraced by courts across the
country. 78 The California Supreme Court7 9 created the Transformative
Use Test to better balance the interests underlying the right of publicity
and the First Amendment. 80 In Comedy III Products, Inc. v. Gary
Saderup, Inc., 8 1 the owner of the rights to the comedy act The Three
Stooges, sued an artist for selling lithographs and T-shirts that bore the
likeness of the Three Stooges in the form of a charcoal drawing. 8 2 The
Comedy court used five factors to help determine whether the work was
transformative enough to overcome the right of publicity and merit First
Amendment protection. 83 The first factor is whether the celebrity's
Identity is simply one of the "raw materials" of the work, rather than the
very substance of it.84 If the work is not substantively based on the

the Rogers test is applicable in Lanham Act cases to weigh the public interest in free expression
against the public interest in avoiding consumer confusion).

73. 296 F.3d 894 (9th Cir. 2002).
74. Id. at 899.
75. Id. at 902.
76. Feinberg, supra note 30, at 212.
77. In re NCAA Student-Athlete Name & Likeness Licensing Litig., 724 F.3d 1268, 1280-

81 (9th Cir. 2013).
78. Feinberg, supra note 30, at 198.

79. See Comedy

Ill Prods., Inc. v. Gary Saderup, Inc., 21 P.3d 797, 808 (Cal. 2001).

80. Feinberg, supra note 30, at 198.

81. 21 P.3d 797 (Cal. 2001).
82. Id at 800-01.
83. See In re NCAA Student-Athlete Name & Likeness Licensing Litig., 724 F.3d 1268,
1274 (9th Cir. 2013) (breaking down the Transformative Use Test into five factors).

84. Comedy 111, 21 P.3d at 809; see also Kirby v. Sega of Am., 50 Cal. Rptr. 3d 607, 615
(Ct. App. 2d 2006) ("The transformative test is straightforward: The 'inquiry is whether the
celebrity likeness is one of the "raw materials" from which an original work is synthesized, or
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celebrity's Identity, then the balance will tilt in favor of treating the work
as transformative and worthy of First Amendment protection. 85 The
second factor is whether the work is primarily the expression of
something other than the celebrity's Identity. 8 6 The third factor focuses
on whether the celebrity's Identity plays a predominant role in the work. 87
The quality of the artistic contribution is irrelevant in determining
whether the work is transformative. 88
The fourth factor is whether the marketability and economic value of
the work is mainly derived from the celebrity's Identity. 89 If the value of
the work primarily comes from the skill, reputation, and creativity of the
artist, rather than the celebrity's Identity, then the work is transformative
enough to warrant First Amendment protection. 90 However, if the value
of the work is primarily based on the celebrity's Identity, then the balance
may tilt in favor of the celebrity's right of publicity depending on the
resolution of the other factors. 9 1 The final factor focuses on whether the
main goal of the work is to commercially exploit a celebrity's Identity
through the creation of a conventional portrait of the celebrity. 92 If the
artist's skill and talent is clearly secondary to the commercial exploitation
of the celebrity's Identity, then the artist's First Amendment right is
outweighed by the celebrity's right of publicity. 93 After applying the
Transformative Use Test, the court held that the artist's charcoal drawing
of the Three Stooges was not transformative. 94 Thus, the artist's work
was not protected under the First Amendment. 9 5 In other words, Comedy
involved an instance in which the right of publicity outweighed the First
Amendment.
The Transformative Use Test has been used to resolve disputes
involving litigants ranging from rock bands 96 to student-athletes 9 7
because it adequately balances one's right to use a celebrity's Identity
against the considerable effort the celebrity exerted to make his or her
whether the depiction or imitation of the celebrity is the very sum and substance of the work in

question."').
85. See Kirby, 50 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 615.
86. Comedy III, 21 p.3d at 809.
87. Id. at 810.
88. Id. at 809.
89. Id.
90. Id.; see also Kirby v. Sega of America, 50 Cal. Rptr. 3d 607, 616 ("Ulala is more than
a mere likeness or literal depiction of Kirby. Ulala contains sufficient expressive content to
constitute a 'transformative work' under the test articulated by the Supreme Court.").

91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.

Comedy III Prods., Inc. v. Gary Saderup, Inc., 21 P.3d 797, 810 (Cal. 2001).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 811.
Id.
See No Doubt v. Activision Publ'g, Inc., 122 Cal. Rptr. 3d 397 (2011).
See Hart v. Elec. Arts, Inc., 717 F.3d 141 (3d Cir. 2013).
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Identity marketable. 98 In No Doubt v. Activision Publishing, Inc.,99 the
rock band No Doubt sued a videogame publisher because it violated the
parties' licensing agreement and released a videogame that improperly
used the band members' Identities.' 00 The court held that the videogame
publisher's use of the band members' Identities in the videogame was not
transformative. 0 1 The court employed the final factor in the
Transformative Use Test and concluded that the graphics and features of
the game were secondary to the videogame publisher's primary goal of
creating a conventional portrait of the band to commercially exploit its
fame.' 0 2
Similarly, in Hart v. Electronic Arts, Inc.,1 03 the court focused on
whether the avatar in the college football videogame represented a
sufficient transformation of the student-athlete's Identity, which included
biographical information.1 04 The court used a couple of the factors in the
Transformative Use Test to balance the interest between the right of
publicity and the First Amendment.1 05 The court held that the interactive
feature of the game that allowed users to alter the avatar was insufficient
to transform the student-athlete's Identity into the video game maker's
own expression. 106 The court also held that realistic depictions of studentathletes were the very substance, not just a raw material, of the college
football video game.1 0 7 In the end, cases like Hart and No Doubt
demonstrate that courts have discretion and need not apply all of the
factors in the Transformative Use Test when balancing the interest
between the right of publicity and the First Amendment.1 08
After evaluating the Predominant Use Test, the Rogers Test, and the
Transformative Use Test, it is clear that the First Amendment can be a
defense to the right of publicity. However, the First Amendment can also
be a vehicle for the right of publicity. Imagine if a student-athlete were to
use his free time to make and post comedic and athletics-related videos.
Over time he gains a considerable following and starts to earn money
from advertisement revenue. One day the NCAA becomes aware that the
student-athlete is earning money from his videos. As a result, the NCAA
confronts him and states that he will either have to stop making money
98. Feinberg, supra note 30, at 213.

99. 122 Cal. Rptr. 3d 397 (2011).
100. Id. at 1022.
101. Id. at 1035.
102. Id.
103. 717 F.3d 141 (3d Cir. 2013).
104. Id. at 165.
105. Id. at 169.
106. Id. at 168.
107. Id.
108. See No Doubt v. Activision Publ'g, Inc., 122 Cal. Rptr. 3d 397 (2011); Hart v. Elec.
Arts, Inc., 717 F.3d 141 (3d Cir. 2013).
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from his videos, or he will lose his scholarship and become ineligible to
continue playing the game he loves.
Unfortunately, in 2017, Donald De La Haye, a UCF punter, had to
make that choice. 1"0 De La Haye had his scholarship taken away by
school officials after he declined to stop profiting off his Identity on
YouTube." 0 He claimed that the school violated his First Amendment
and due process rights by taking away his scholarship."' He eventually
settled out-of-court with the school officials who revoked his
scholarship." 2 As a result, the court never got the opportunity to decide
whether the First Amendment could protect a student-athlete's Identity.
Nevertheless, the following discussion will demonstrate that the First
Amendment can work in concert with the right of publicity and protect a
3
student-athlete's Identity."
III. THE IMPORTANCE OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION FOR STUDENT
ATHLETES

The First Amendment states, inter alia, that "Congress shall make no
law ... abridging the freedom of speech." 114 The freedom of speech is
arguably the most important freedom guaranteed by the Constitution.
Justice Cardozo once referred to the freedom of speech and thought as
"the matrix, the indispensable condition, of nearly every other
freedom."" 5 Justice Brandeis argued that free speech was capable of
freeing people from irrational fears." 6 Throughout the years, various
theories have been promulgated to explain why freedom of speech should
be protected.'
One theory is that the freedom of speech is necessary for the
procurement of truth.' 18 John Stuart Mill argued that silencing an opinion
109. See Dan Gartland, UCF Kicker Ruled Ineligible After YouTube Channel Gets Him in
Trouble with NCAA, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED (July 31, 2017), https://www.si.com/collegefootball/2017/07/31/ucf-kicker-donald-de-la-haye-ineligible-ncaa-youtube-videos

[https://perma

.cc/T7WC-UFPQ].
110. David Harris & Iliana Limon Romero, Former UCF Kicker, YouTube Star Settles

Lawsuit with School, ORLANDO SENTINEL (Nov. 2, 2018, 10:45 PM), https://www.orlando
sentinel.com/news/breaking-news/os-ne-donald-de-la-haye-lawsuit-settle-

2

0181102-story.html

[https://permacc/W6G9-SGQX].
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. See infra Part 11.
114. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
115. Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 327 (1939).
116. Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 376 (1927).
117. See Hart v. Elec. Arts, Inc., 717 F.3d 141, 150 (3d Cir. 2013) ("[F]reedom of expression
is not only essential to check tyranny and foster self-government but also intrinsic to individual
liberty and dignity and instrumental in society's search for truth.") (quoting Dun & Bradstreet,

Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 787 (1985) (Brennan, J., dissenting)).
118. See id.
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is even more harmful to those who dissent from the opinion than it is to
the speaker.'1 9 Mill proposed three reasons why suppressing speech is
deleterious.12 0 First, the suppressed opinion may be true.12 1 If the
suppressed opinion is true, then the effect of suppression is that everyone
is robbed of the opportunity to attain the truth.12 Second, a false opinion
should not be suppressed because it can lead to a better understanding of
the truth. 2 3 If a true opinion is not frequently discussed, and challenged
by others, then it will cease to be a robust, living truth.12 4 Lastly, the
speaker and the dissenter may share the truth.12 One's opinion may
supply the missing piece of truth that the other's opinion lacks.1 2 6
Similarly, in the judicial sphere, Justice Holmes has argued that "the best
test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the
competition of the market."1 2 7
Another theory is that freedom of speech is necessary for selfgovernance. 12 8 Alexander Meiklejohn argued that freedom of speech
protects the citizenry's ability to be self-governing. 12 9 He wrote that
"[w]hen men govern themselves, it is they-and no one else-who must
pass judgment upon unwisdom and unfairness and danger." 3 0 In order
for the citizenry to be self-governing, Meiklejohn argues that political
deliberations must be protected by the First Amendment.1 3 1 Moreover, he
argued that the protection should be focused on not prohibiting the
discussion of policies when they appear false or dangerous.1 3 2 If citizens
who are in charge of deciding issues relating to public policy are denied
the opportunity to be confronted with opposing opinions, their resolutions

will be half-baked.1 33
The final theory that has received great attention is that freedom. of
speech or expression is necessary for self-fulfillment.1 34 The selffulfillment theory argues that freedom of expression protects and

119.
120.
121.
122.
123.

See JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 49 (Batoche Books 2001) (1859).

Id. at 49-50.
Id. at 50.
Id.
Id

124. MILL, supra note 119, at 50.

125.
126.
127.
128.

Id. at 50-51.
Id.
Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
See Hart v. Elec. Arts, Inc., 717 F.3d 141, 150 (3d Cir. 2013).

129.

ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO SELF-GOVERNANCE 26

(1948).
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.

Id. at 26.
Id at 24-25.
Id at 26.
Id.
See Hart v. Elec. Arts, Inc., 717 F.3d 141, 150 (3d Cir. 2013).
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encourages the exercise of human abilities. 1 35 It encourages a person to
create and express ideas in exact, complex, and subtle ways through
speech, writing, pictures, and music. 6 Moreover, the freedom of
expression protects an individual's autonomy by disfavoring contentrelated restrictions on communication.1 7 In relation to the selffulfillment theory, courts have recognized that the freedom of expression
is necessary to the development of ideas and one's sense of identity.1 3 8
The freedom of expression also protects the listener's ability to decide
whether she wants to listen to the speaker's message.1 39 A government
that dictates what messages people can be exposed to by restricting
speech displays contempt for personal autonomy and a person's ability to
decide what messages to be exposed to.1 4 0 In the end, the self-fulfillment
theory recognizes that freedom of expression is important because of its
strong relation to autonomous self-determination.14
The theory that best lends itself to protecting the right of studentathletes to profit from their Identities is the self-fulfillment theory of
freedom of expression. First, the search for truth theory is inadequate
because it does not protect the right of student-athletes to profit from their
Identities. When a university at the implicit or explicit behest of the
NCAA informs a student that he will lose his scholarship if he does not
stop profiting from his YouTube videos, 14 2 the issue is commercial. This
issue is not related to a search for truth because the NCAA will allow
student-athletes to continue posting videos as long as they do not profit
from the videos.1 4 3 Therefore, the search for truth theory is inapplicable
because it does not protect the commercial interest of student-athletes.
Likewise, the self-governance theory is inapplicable because a studentathlete who is prohibited from profiting from his or her videos or posts is
not directly or indirectly prevented from attending town meetings or
otherwise participating in the political discourse.
Unlike the aforementioned theories, the self-fulfillment theory is
applicable to the issue at hand because allowing student-athletes to profit
135. David A.

J. Richards,

Free Speech and Obscenity Law: TowardA Moral Theory of the

FirstAmendment, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 45, 62 (1974).
136. Id
137. Id.
138. See Hart, 717 F.3d at 149 ("The Supreme Court in Procunierv. Martinez noted that the
protection of free speech serves the needs 'of the human spirit-a spirit that demands self-

expression,' adding that '[s]uch expression is an integral part of the development of ideas and a
sense of identity."') (quoting Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 427 (1974) overruledon other
grounds by Thornburgh v. Abbott, 490 U.S. 401 (1989)).
139. Richards, supra note 135, at 62.

140. Id.
141. Id.
142. See Gartland,supra note 109.

143. See id.
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from their Identities through their videos or posts demonstrates respect
for the autonomy of student-athletes. Human beings are distinguished
from other animals principally by the qualities of their mind.'"
Therefore, people should be free to explore the limits of their abilities and
develop their character.14 5 A student-athlete, like any human being, may
find meaning in life through the development of his imagination and
personality by expressing himself through videos and posts. 14 6 A restraint
on student-athletes' ability to make profitable videos and posts affects the
development of student-athletes; moreover, it represents an affront to the
dignity of student-athletes because the restriction prevents studentathletes from expressing themselves. 147
By forcing student-athletes to choose between keeping their athletic
scholarship or their profitable business, the NCAA has denied studentathletes access to the full liberties of both students and athletes. A student
is allowed to receive an academic scholarship and pursue outside income.
Likewise, a professional athlete is paid for his or her performance on the
field of play and is allowed to earn outside income. However, a studentathlete 4 8 is not allowed to receive a scholarship and profit from his or
Identity like a student, and a student-athlete, unlike a professional athlete,
is not paid for his or her performance on the field of play.1 4 9 As it stands,
the NCAA's policies have restricted the autonomy and self-development
of student-athletes.
IV. COMMERCIAL SPEECH AND STUDENT ATHLETES

In addition to the self-fulfillment theory of free expression, the
commercial speech doctrine justifies allowing student-athletes to profit
from their Identities through the advertisement revenue generated from
their videos and posts. In 1942, the United States Supreme Court held
that commercial speech was unprotected under the First Amendment.15 0
Over time, the Court clarified the contours of the unprotected category of
commercial speech, indicating that purely commercial speech was
unprotected, but speech that contained both commercial 'and political
components was protected.1 5 ' Moreover, the Court specified that speech
144. Thomas 1. Emerson, Toward A General Theory of the FirstAmendment, 72 YALE L.J.

877, 879 (1963).
145. Id.
146. See id.
147. See id. ("[S]uppression of belief, opinion and expression is an affront to the dignity of
man, a negation of man's essential nature.").
148. A moment's reflection makes it clear that the term "student-athlete" is one of the
greatest oxymorons ever invented for a student-athlete is neither a student nor an athlete.
149. Osburn, supra note 13.
150. See Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52, 54 (1942) overruled by Va. State Bd. of

Pharmacy, 425 U.S. 748 (1976).
151. N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 266 (1964).

124

UNIVERSITY OFFLORIDA JOURNAL OFLA W & PUBLIC POLICY

[Vol. 32

was protected even if transmitted through a medium that was sold for
profit, like books and newspapers.1 5 2 In 1976, more than thirty years after
making commercial speech an unprotected category, the Court
reexamined whether commercial speech was unprotected under the First
Amendment. 5 3
In Virginia State Board of Pharmacyv. Virginia Citizens Consumer
15
the Supreme Court held, for the first time, that
Council, Inc.,4
commercial speech was partially protected under the First
Amendment.1 5 5 In VirginiaState Boardof Pharmacy, the appellee was a
pharmacist who wanted to advertise that he sold "X prescription drug at
the Y price."' 56 In reaching its holding, the Court disregarded the notion
that the advertiser's purely economic ,interest made his speech an
unprotected category under the First Amendment.1 57 The Court reasoned
that the general public is likely to be interested in commercial speech
because it involves the dissemination of information related to the sale of
goods and services. 158 Moreover, in a free enterprise economy, exposing
the general public to various advertisements relating to commercial
transactions will presumably lead to better-informed private economic
decisions.1 59
The Court has defined commercial speech in a few ways since it first
afforded commercial speech First Amendment protection.1 6 0 One
definition of commercial speech relies on the "commonsense
distinctions" between commercial and noncommercial speech.161
Another defmition of commercial speech is speech that solely proposes a
commercial transaction.1 62 Lastly, commercial speech has been defined
as speech related solely to the economic interests of the speaker and his
or her audience.1 63 Partly due to the various defmitions of commercial

152. Id.
153. Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 76061(1976).
154. Id. at 748.
155. Id. at 770.
156. Id. at 761.
157. Id. at 762.
158. Va. State Bd. Of Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 765.
159. Id.
160.. J. Wesley Earnhardt, Nike, Inc. v. Kasky: A Golden Opportunity to Define Commercial

Speech-Why Wouldn't the Supreme Court Finally "Just Do ItTM"?, 82 N.C. L. REv. 797, 799
(2004).
161. Zauderer v. Off. of Disciplinary Couns. of the Sup. Ct. of Ohio, 471 U.S. 626, 637
(1985).
162. United States v. United Foods, Inc., 533 U.S. 405, 409 (2001).
163. Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557, 561
(1980).
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speech employed by the Court, the scope and effect of commercial speech
is still uncertain.164
This Note adopts the Bolger v. Youngs Drug Products Corp.165
articulation of commercial speech. In Bolger, a corporation that was
engaged in the manufacturing and selling of contraceptives decided to
carry out an advertising campaign where it disseminated unsolicited
pamphlets to members of the public.1 66 The corporation sought to mail
three types of pamphlets: (1) a pamphlet that promoted a variety of
products available at a drug store, including prophylactics; (2) a pamphlet
that substantially promoted prophylactics; and (3) an informational
pamphlet that discussed the desirability and availability of prophylactics
in general. 167 The Postal Service warned the corporation that its mailing

violated 39 U.S.C. § 3001(e)(2), which prohibits the mailing of
unsolicited advertisements for contraceptives. 168 The Supreme Court
affirmed the district court's ruling and held that as applied to the
corporation's mailings, the statute violates the First Amendment.1 69
To reach its conclusion, the Court first determined whether the
mailings constituted commercial speech.1 70 The Court easily concluded
that the first and second type of pamphlet constituted commercial speech
because those pamphlets solely proposed a commercial transaction. 17 1
Conversely, the Court faced a tough task in classifying the informational
pamphlets because they could not be categorized as speech merely
proposing a commercial transaction. 17 2 To determine whether the
informational pamphlets constituted commercial speech, the Court
identified three considerations: 7 3 (1) whether the communication is an
advertisement;1 74 (2) whether the communication refers to a specific
product;1 75 and (3) whether the speaker has an economic motivation in
disseminating the communication. 176 The Court concluded that a
combination of the aforementioned considerations provided strong
support for classifying the informational pamphlets as commercial

164. Earnhardt, supra note 160, at 799.

165.
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.

463 U.S. 60 (1983).
Id. at 62.
Id.
Id at 63; 39 U.S.C. § 3001(e)(2) (2018).
Bolger, 463 U.S. at 61.
Id at 65.
Id. at 66.
Id.

173. See Jordan v. Jewel Food Stores, Inc., 743 F.3d 509, 519 (7th Cir. 2014) ("[T]he Bolger
inquiry asks whether the speech in question is in the form of an advertisement, refers to a specific
product, and has an economic motive.").

174. Bolger, 463 U.S. at 66.
175. Id.
176. Id. at 67.
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speech, even though none of the factors alone would have classified the
informational pamphlets as commercial speech."'7 The Court also
addressed the issue of mixed commercial and noncommercial speech; it
ruled that commercial speech regarding matters of public concern will
not be entitled to the stronger constitutional protection given to
noncommercial speech because such protection would allow commercial
speakers to make false or misleading claims with impunity.1 78
According to the NCAA, a student-athlete's amateur status may be
impacted if the student-athlete, inter alia, promotes or endorses a
commercial product or service.1 7 9 The NCAA's amateurism restrictions
conflict with the constitutional rights of student-athletes to profit from
their Identities through social media and/or endorsements under the
commercial speech doctrine of the First Amendment.1 80 The Supreme
Court has made it clear that individuals acting in a professional capacity
can engage in commercial speech.181 Yet, the Court has never addressed
the question of whether individuals can engage in nonprofessional
commercial speech.' 8 2 Nevertheless, the distinction between individuals
acting in a professional or nonprofessional capacity is not likely to be
dispositive because the Court has also held that the identity of the speaker
is not a determinative factor in categorizing speech as commercial.' 83 As
a result, student-athletes, who are nonprofessional individuals, may have
their speech protected if it meets the requirements of the commercial
speech doctrine.
First, to attain such protection under the First Amendment, the Bolger
considerations must weigh in favor of classifying a student-athlete's
speech involving social media and/or endorsements as commercial
speech. 184 In regard to a student-athlete who seeks to profit from social
media, the Bolger considerations weigh in favor of classifying the videos
and posts that the student-athlete disseminates on social media as
commercial speech.

177. Id.
178. Id. at 68.
179. Amateurism, supra note 7.
180. "[F]orms of electronic communication (such as websites for social networking and

microblogging) through which users create online communities to share information, ideas,
personal messages, and other content (such as videos)." Social media, MERRIAM-WEBSTER,
https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/social%20media

[https://perma.cc/9T77-LDEN]

(last visited Jan. 4, 2020).
181. See Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748
(1976) (involving a pharmacist); Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350, 384 (1977) (involving
an attorney).
182. Alison L. Stohr, Valor for Sale: Applying the Commercial Speech Exception to SelfPromotingIndividuals, 85 TEMP. L. REV. 455, 469 (2013).

183. First Nat. Bank of Bos. v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 776-77 (1978).
184. Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 66-67 (1983).

MONEY

2021 ]

TALKS

127

The first Bolger consideration is whether the communication is an
advertisement.1 85 Advertising is no longer confined to television
commercials, billboards, and print.1 86 Today, individuals engage in
personal branding where they manage and commercialize their online
presence.1 87 As a result, student-athletes who use their Identities to profit
from social media meet the first consideration because they are engaged
in advertisement of their personal brands.
The second Bolger consideration is whether the communication refers
to a specific product.1 88 The content of the videos and posts that studentathletes disseminate to their social media fans and followers constitute
specific products. The reason why people like Lilly Singh become
YouTube stars with millions of subscribers is because viewers gravitate
to their content. 189 Given that viewers consume the content by viewing,
liking, and subscribing to the creator's channel or profile, it is fair to say
that student-athletes who create social media content meet the second
Bolger consideration because their communications refer to a specific
product.
The final Bolger consideration is whether the speaker has an economic
motivation in disseminating the communication. 190 Objectively, it is clear
that creating content and posting it on social media platforms such as
YouTube can be a profitable undertaking. For instance, in 2018, the top
ten YouTube stars earned in total $180.5 million.19' The going rate, in
terms of ad dollars, for top YouTube stars is about $5 per thousand
views. 19 2 Although it is difficult to ascertain one's motivations, it would
be fair to infer that a student-athlete who accepts the ad dollars generated
by her posts is economically motivated to disseminate content. In the end,
the milange of the Bolger considerations strongly weighs in favor of
classifying a student-athletes videos and posts on social media as
commercial speech.
Similarly, the Bolger considerations strongly weigh in favor of
classifying student-athlete endorsements as commercial speech. In the
case of a student-athlete who endorses a product or business, the Bolger
185. Id. at 66.
186. Stohr, supra note 182, at 476.
187. Id. at 482.

188. Bolger, 463 U.S. at 66.
189. Stephanie Schomer, Lilly Singh Conquered YouTube

Hollywood,

-Now She's Taking On

(Mar. 15, 2019), https://www.entrepreneur.com/article/328067
[https://perma.cc/4FHZ-6HET].
190. Bolger, 463 U.S. at 67.
191. Natalie Robehmed & Madeline Berg, Highest-PaidYouTube Stars 2018: Markiplier,
ENTREPRENEUR

Jake Paul, PewDiePie and more, FORBES (Dec. 3, 2018), https://www.forbes.com/sites/

natalierobehmed/2018/12/03/highest-paid-youtube-stars-2018-markiplier-jake-paul-pewdiepieand-more/#7024e852909a [https://perma.cc/6YUL-JBSQ].
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considerations are easily met. The first Bolger consideration is whether
the communication is an advertisement.1 9 3 In general, an advertisement
is a public notice. 194 When an individual endorses a product or business,
he or she provides a notice to the public that the product should be bought,
or the business should be patronized. Thus, if a student-athlete endorses
a product or business, the first Bolger consideration will weigh in favor
of classifying his or her speech as commercial speech because the
communication will be considered an advertisement. The second Bolger
consideration is whether the communication refers to a specific product
or business. 195 This will be easy to establish because advertisements
where an individual endorses a company's product or business typically,
if not always, involve a reference to the product or business in question.
Lastly, the third Bolger consideration is whether the speaker has an
economic motivation in disseminating the communication.1 9 6 To
understand the economic motivation that student-athletes have in
endorsing products, it is helpful to look at those entrusted to lead themcollege coaches. In 2019, the top ten highest-paid college coaches earned
no less than six million dollars.1 97 To note, the bulk of college coaches'
compensation comes from the portion of their contracts that relate to
personal service fees which includes media appearances, endorsements,
and representing the university.1 98 For instance, in the 2011-2012 season,
Nick Saban earned about $225,000 from his coaching salary and $3.93
million from media appearances, endorsements, and representing the
university.1 99 Leaving aside the injustice of allowing college coaches to
make millions of dollars beyond their "coaching salary" while studentathletes are limited with an athletic scholarship, it is clear that there is a
market for those involved in college athletics to profit from their
Identities through endorsements. Given that there is a market for studentathletes to endorse products and businesses, the third Bolger
consideration weighs in favor of classifying student-athlete endorsements
as commercial speech because student-athletes will be economically
motivated to disseminate their endorsement of a product or business.
193. Bolger, 463 U.S. at 66.
194. Advertisement, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/
advertisement [https://perma.cc/992F-5M4T] (last visited Jan. 5, 2020).
195. Bolger, 463 U.S. at 66.
196. Id at 67.
197. Thomas Barrabi, College Football's Highest-PaidCoaches Earn Million, Fly Private
at Taxpayer-Funded Public Universities, FOX Bus. (Oct. 23, 2019), https://www.fox
business.com/sports/college-football-highest-paid-coaches-public-universities [https://perma.cc/

XGX3-SC86].
198. James K. Gentry & Raquel Meyer Alexander, From the Sideline to the Bottom Line,

N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 31, 2011), https://www.nytimes.com/2012/01/01/sports/ncaafootball/contractsfor-top-college-football-coaches-grow-complicated.html [https://perma.cc/N6EG-7YXS].
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SPEECH, STATE ACTION, AND NCAA POLICIES

A few years before the Bolger decision, the Court in CentralHudson
Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service Commission of New York 200 held
that restrictions on commercial speech are subject to intermediate
scrutiny. 201 The first part of the Central Hudson test asks whether the
commercial speech at issue concerns lawful activity, and is not false,
misleading, or deceptive. 02 The second question is whether the
government has demonstrated a substantial or significant interest for
restricting the commercial speech in question.203 If both queries result in
affirmative responses, then the court must determine whether the
restriction directly advances the asserted substantial governmental
interest in a manner that is not more extensive than is necessary. 204 This
last part of the test looks to whether there is a "reasonable fit" between
the substantial governmental interest and the restriction. 2 05
Upon establishing that student-athletes' videos and posts on social
media can constitute commercial speech, it is now important to determine
whether the entity in question, the NCAA, can be scrutinized for
constitutional violations under the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process
Clause. Generally, the Fourteenth Amendment does not protect against
private conduct that abridges individual rights. 206 The Supreme Court's
Fourteenth Amendment jurisprudence differentiates between state action,
which is subject to scrutiny, and private conduct, which is not subject to
scrutiny. 207 In NCAA v. Tarkanian,208 the Court held that the NCAA was
not subject to scrutiny because its conduct did not constitute state
action. 2 9 In Tarkanian, the University of Nevada, Las Vegas (UNLV)
informed its head basketball coach, Jerry Tarkanian, that it was going to
suspend him for violations of NCAA rules. 2 10 The suspension was
motivated by the fact that the "NCAA had placed the university's
basketball team on probation for two years and ordered UNLV to show
cause why the NCAA should not impose further penalties unless UNLV

200. 447 U.S. 557, 566 (1980).
201. Id at 573 (Blackmun, J., concurring).

202. Id at 566.
203. Id.
204. Id
205. Kasky v. Nike, Inc., 45 P.3d 243, 251 (Cal. 2002) (citing Board of Trustees, State Univ.
of N.Y. v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 480 (1989).
206. Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n v. Tarkanian, 488 U.S. 179, 191 (1988) (citing Burton
v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715, 722 (1961)).
207. Id. (first citing Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 13 (1948); then citing Jackson v.

Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 349 (1974)).
208. 488 U.S. 179 (1988).
209. Id at 181-82.
210. Id. at 180-81.
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severed all ties during the probation between its intercollegiate athletic
program and Tarkanian."21
The main issue before the Court was "whether UNLV's actions in
compliance with the NCAA rules and recommendations turned the
NCAA's conduct into state action." 2 12 To resolve the issue, the Court
analyzed the relationship between UNLV and the NCAA. 213 First, the
Court concluded that UNLV's decision to adopt the NCAA's standards
and its minor role in the formulation of the NCAA's rules did not
establish that the NCAA was engaged in state action. 2 14 Second, the Court
determined that the NCAA's investigation, enforcement proceedings, and
consequent recommendations did not constitute state action because
UNLV did not delegate power to the NCAA to take action against any
university employee. 21 5 Moreover, the Court stated that the NCAA is
similar to a state-compensated public defender 216 in that it is properly
viewed as a private actor in opposition to the State when it represents the
interests of its entire membership in an investigation of one public
university. 2 17 Lastly, the Court entertained the notion that UNLV had no
practical alternative to compliance with the NCAA's demands and
concluded that a private monopolist that imposes its will on a state agency
by threatening to not deal with it does not engage in state action. 2 18
Although the Court in Tarkanian essentially foreclosed direct action
against the NCAA for violating the Constitution, 2 19 individuals still have
a way to indirectly affect the NCAA. The First Amendment applies to the
2 20
States through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
The Court made it clear that a state university is a state actor and that its
executive officials act under color of state law when performing their
official functions. 22 1 As a result, a student-athlete, who attends a state
university or college, can sue his university or college when it acts in
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accordance with the NCAA's rules and regulations to violate his
commercial speech rights.
To fully appreciate the viability of indirectly enforcing one's rights
against the NCAA, it is important to wade through a few statistics. Based
on data from the 2020-2021 academic year, the NCAA has 1,108
member schools. 22 2 Of the 1,108 member schools, 475 are public
universities or colleges, and 633 are private universities or colleges. 2 2 3 It
is necessary to filter for Division I member schools because television
and marketing rights fees, primarily from the Division I men's basketball
championship, generate the majority of the NCAA's revenue. 2 2 4
When accounting solely for Division I member schools, there are 233
public universities or colleges and 117 private universities or colleges. 22 5
Given that about sixty-seven percent of Division I member schools are
public universities or colleges, student-athletes who attend those schools
can have a significant impact on the NCAA. By successfully suing the
public Division I member schools of the NCAA, student-athletes will
threaten the NCAA's main source of revenue. For instance, the public
Division I member schools that are successfully sued will likely begin to
consider options similar to UNLV, the public Division I university in
Tarkanian: (1) disobey the NCAA's rules and regulations and risk
sanctions, (2) obey the NCAA's rules and regulations and risk violating
the constitutional rights of others, or (3) leave the NCAA. 226 Unlike
UNLV in Tarkanian,227 the public Division I member schools that are
sued for violating the commercial speech rights of their student-athletes
will probably be more likely to threaten to leave the NCAA unless
changes are made because as a group the public Division I member
schools have leverage as they generate a significant portion of the
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NCAA's revenue. 2 2 8 Therefore, student-athletes at public Division I
member schools can hold the NCAA accountable by suing their
respective member schools for violating their commercial speech rights.
CONCLUSION

Watching college athletics generates a certain je ne sais quoi among
viewers in the United States, and some may worry that allowing studentathletes to be compensated will damage their viewing experience. This
Note operates under the assumption that college athletics will continue to
thrive even if student-athletes, like everyone else involved with college
athletics, are compensated. To be clear, this Note does not contend that
student-athletes must be paid to play their respective sports; rather, this
Note argues that student-athletes must be allowed to profit from their
Identities and maximize their potential as young professionals.
Accordingly, the purpose of this Note was to showcase that the First
Amendment can and must protect the ability of student-athletes to profit
from their Identities. This Note examined the history of the right of
publicity and explained why the First Amendment will better protect the
ability of student-athletes to monetize their Identities. This Note also
highlighted how the freedom of expression will allow student-athletes to
explore the limits of their abilities and develop as people. Furthermore,
this Note analyzed the commercial speech doctrine and demonstrated
how student-athletes' videos and posts on social media and endorsements
can be classified as commercial speech worthy of First Amendment
protection. In the end, this Note illustrated how student-athletes can
indirectly enforce their First Amendment commercial speech rights
against private actors such as the NCAA by suing the public universities
and colleges that execute the unconstitutional policies of the NCAA.
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